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Abstract
The aims of this study are twofold. First, we consider an optimal risk allo-
cation problem with non-convex preferences. By establishing an infimal rep-
resentation for distortion risk measures, we give some necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of optimal and asymptotic optimal allocations. We
will show that, similar to a market with convex preferences, in a non-convex
framework with distortion risk measures the boundedness of the optimal risk
allocation problem depends only on the preferences. Second, we consider the
same optimal allocation problem by adding a further assumption that alloca-
tions are co-monotone. We characterize the co-monotone optimal risk alloca-
tions within which we prove the “marginal risk allocations” take only the values
zero or one. Remarkably, we can separate the role of the market preferences
and the total risk in our representation.
1 Introduction
There is considerable interest in the problem of optimal risk allocation, as it is at
the heart of many financial and insurance applications. Optimal risk sharing, op-
timal capital allocation, theory of market equilibrium, optimal reinsurance design
and optimal risk exchange are only a few examples. This problem dates back to
the 50s and 60s when Allais (1953), Arrow (1964), Sharpe (1964), Borch (1960),
Mossin (1966) and many others studied the optimal risk allocations for different
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economic problems. Thereafter, researchers started to elaborate further on the as-
pects of this problem for a variety of assumptions. By development of risk measures
and their applications in finance and insurance, the problem of optimal risk allo-
cation has been revisited by using coherent risk measures of Artzner et al. (1999),
convex risk measures of Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002) and deviation measures of risk of
Rockafellar et al. (2006). The first attempt to study the problem in a setting with
coherent risk measures was Heath and Ku (2004), where the authors established a
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a Pareto optimal allocation.
Barrieu and El Karoui (2004) considered a risk sharing problem in a dynamic setup,
whereas Jouini et al. (2008) considered a static framework with law-invariant convex
risk measures. Filipovic´ and Kupper (2008a) looked at the optimal risk allocation
problem from a pricing point of view, while Filipovic´ and Kupper (2008b) consid-
ered it for optimal capital allocations. Acciaio (2007) studied a sharing pooled risk
problem with non-necessarily monotone monetary utilities. While there is extensive
research on the problem of optimal risk allocation with convex preferences, studies
using non-convex framework have been relatively scarce, whereas in many appli-
cations preferences are not convex, and the results of the existing settings cannot
be applied to them. This is mainly due to the lack of appropriate mathematical
techniques to study models with the non-convex preferences.
In this paper, by establishing an infimal representation for distortion risk mea-
sures, we find a new way to study the optimal risk allocation problem with non-convex
preferences. We prove that the boundedness of the optimal risk allocation problem
is independent of the total risk and only depends on the market preferences. The ap-
proach we have chosen is a finance oriented approach which gives rise to the definition
of generalized stochastic discount factors for non-convex preferences (see Remark 2
below). Our results generalize results of Jouini et al. (2008) , Filipovic´ and Kupper
(2008a) and Filipovic´ and Kupper (2008b) towards a new direction by using non-
convex risk measures. This constitutes the first part of the paper. In the second
part, with an extra assumption that the risk allocations are co-monotone, we char-
acterize the optimal risk allocations in the same market. This assumption can be
interpreted as mutualization of risks, which is closely related to the moral hazard
risk1. Interestingly, we see that the optimal risk allocations in a setting with distor-
tion risk measures are in a perfect accordance with this assumption. It is shown in
Filipovic´ and Svindland (2008) that the solutions to a general market risk allocation
problem with convex distortion risk measures are co-monotone, and therefore, rule
out the risk of moral hazard. However, we will see within an example that this no
1 In order to avoid the moral hazard risk, allocations have to be increasing in terms of market
risks.
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longer holds true when agents use non-convex distortion risk measures. That is why
we have to assume that the allocations are co-monotone. In order to characterize
the co-monotone optimal solutions, we introduce the “marginal risk allocations”. A
marginal risk allocation is the marginal rate of changes in the value of a contract
when we marginally change the value of the total risk. It is shown that, in a market
with co-monotone risk allocations, the marginal risk allocations take only the values
zero or one. This way, we can remarkably separate the role of the market preferences
and the total risk in the optimal risk allocations. Our results find a new character-
ization of the optimal allocations in Chateauneuf et al. (2000) enabling us for more
precise interpretation of the optimal allocations and also finding further applications
in other fields such as the optimal re-insurance design. This paper generalize the lit-
erature of optimal re-insurance design in two directions. First, we use a larger family
of (non-convex) risk measures and premiums and second, we increase the number of
players from two to n (e.g. see, Cai et al. (2008), Cheung (2010),Chi (2012b), Chi
(2012a), Chi and Tan (2013) , Cheung et al. (2014) and Assa (2015)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the
needed notions and notations, and recall some facts from convex analysis. In Section
3, first, we set up the main problem, second, we discuss some necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of general solutions, and, third, we characterize the co-
monotone optimal solutions.
2 Preliminaries and Notations
Throughout the paper, we will fix a probability space (Ω,F , P ), where F is a σ-
algebra and P is a probability measure on F . Let p, q ∈ [1,∞] be two numbers such
that 1/p+1/q = 1. For p 6=∞, Lp denotes the space of real-valued random variables
X on Ω such that E (|X|p) <∞, where E represents the mathematical expectation.
Recall that according to the Riesz Representation Theorem, Lq is the dual space of
Lp when p 6=∞. We endow the space Lp with two topologies, first the norm topology
induced by ‖X‖p = E(|X|
p)
1
p , and second the weak topology, induced by Lq i.e. the
coarsest topology in which all members of Lq are continuous. As usual the latter
topology is denoted by σ(Lp, Lq).
In this paper we consider that Lp represents the space of all loss variables2. We
only have two periods of time 0 and T , representing the beginning of the year when
a contract is written, and the end the year when liabilities are settled, respectively.
2Unlike finance literature which consider profit variable, we found the loss variable more conve-
nient to deal with.
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Every random variable represents losses at time T . Whenever we talk about risk or
premium we mean the present value of the loss and the premium at time T = 0.
2.1 Distortion Risk Measures
Let Φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be a non-decreasing and ca´dla´g function such that Φ(0) =
1− Φ(1) = 0. Φ can introduce a measure on [0, 1] whose values on the intervals are
given as mΦ [a, b) = Φ (b) − Φ (a) and mΦ (b) = 1 − lima↑1 Φ (a). Introduce the set
DΦ as follows
DΦ =
{
X ∈ L0 |
ˆ 1
0
VaRt(X)dΦ(t) ∈ R
}
, (1)
where the integral above is the Lebesgue integral and
VaRα(X) = inf{x ∈ R|P (X > x) ≤ 1− α}, α ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 1. A distortion risk measure ̺Φ (or simply ̺) is a mapping from DΦ to
R defined as
̺Φ(X) =
ˆ 1
0
VaRt(X)dΦ(t), (2)
If we let g(x) := 1− Φ(1 − x) one can see that
̺Φ(X) =
0ˆ
−∞
(g(SX(t))− 1) dt+
∞ˆ
0
g(SX(t))dt, (3)
where SX = 1 − FX is the survival function associated with X . Note that we can
associate ̺ with Φ by using the notation Φ̺. This is a Choquet integral representation
of the risk measure. In the literature, g is known as the distortion function. A
popular example is Value at Risk (VaR), whose distortion function is given by g(t) =
1[1−α,1](t) for a confidence level 1− α. It can also explicitly be given as
VaRα(X) = inf{x ∈ R|P (X > x) ≤ 1− α}.
Another example of a distortion risk measure is Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR),
when Φ(t) = t−α
1−α
1[α,1](t) and can be represented in terms of VaR
CVaRα(x) =
1
1− α
ˆ 1
α
VaRt(X)dt. (4)
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The family of spectral risk measures which was introduced first in Acerbi (2002), is
a distortion risk when Φ is convex.
Remark 1. One can readily see that ̺Φ is law invariant, i.e., if X and X
′ are iden-
tically distributed, then we have ̺Φ(X) = ̺Φ(X
′). Indeed, it can be shown that
all law-invariant co-monotone additive coherent risk measures can be represented as
(2); see Kusuoka (2001). A risk measure in the form (2) is important from different
perspectives. First of all, it makes a link between the risk measure theory and the
behavioral finance as the form (2) is a particular form of distortion utility. Second,
(2) contains a family of risk measures which are statistically robust. In Cont et al.
(2010) it is shown that a risk measure ̺(x) =
´ 1
0
VaRt(x)dΦ(t) is robust if and only
if the support of ϕ = dΦ(t)
dt
3 is away from zero or one. For example Value at Risk
is a risk measure with this property. distortion utilities have become increasingly
important in the literature of decision making since they take into account some
known behavioral paradoxes such as the Allais paradox under risk and the Ells-
berg paradox under uncertainty. Schmeidler (1989) (under uncertainty) and Quiggin
(1982) and Yaari (1984), Yaari (1986) (under risk) show by assuming co-monotone
independence, preferences are according to utilities which admit a distortion integral
representation. It is worth mentioning that, distortion integrals have become very
popular in the literature of insurance because they are the natural extensions of im-
portant insurance risk premiums such as Proportional Hazards Premium Principle,
Wang’s Premium Principle and Net Premium Principle (see Wang et al. (1997) and
Young (2006)).
Finally, we have the definition of a coherent risk measure
Definition 2. A coherent risk measure ̺ is a lower semi-continuous4(see below for
definition of lower semi-continuous) mapping from Lp to R ∪ {+∞} such that
1. ̺(λX) = λ̺(X), for all λ > 0 and X ∈ Lp;
2. ̺(X + c) = ̺(X) + c, for all X ∈ Lp and c ∈ R;
3. ̺(X) ≤ ̺(Y ), for all X, Y ∈ Lp and X ≤ Y ;
4. ̺(X + Y ) ≤ ̺(X) + ̺(Y ), ∀X, Y ∈ Lp;
As one can see, a coherent risk measure is positive homogeneous. As we will see in
the next section, there is a closed and convex subset ∆̺ ⊆ L
q, such that ̺(X) =
sup Y ∈∆̺E(Y X). One can show that for any Y ∈ ∆̺, we have E(Y ) = 1 and Y ≥ 0.
3ϕ is a general derivative of Φ.
4The risk measure in general does not need to be lower semi-continuous in L∞, however we add
it to be consistent with Lp, p 6=∞.
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2.2 Some Facts from Convex Analysis
Here we recall some relevant discussions from the convex analysis. Recalling from
the convex analysis, for any convex function φ, the domain of φ denoted by dom(φ)
is equal to {X ∈ Lp|φ(X) <∞}, and the dual of φ, denoted by φ∗, is defined as
φ∗(Y ) = supX∈Lp E(XY )−φ(X). A convex function is called lower-semi-continuous
iff φ = φ∗∗. In this paper, we assume all convex functions are lower semi continuous.
For a convex set C ⊆ Lp, the indicator function of C is denoted by χC and is
equal to 0 if X ∈ C, and +∞, otherwise. One can incorporate any type of convex
restriction by using an appropriate indicator function. Let C be a closed and convex
set representing a convex restriction on φ. By introducing φC = φ+χC we incorporate
the restriction C. Note that φC is a convex function.
For any positive homogeneous convex function φ let
∆φ = {Y ∈ L
q|E(Y X) ≤ φ(X), ∀X ∈ Lp} .
It is easy to see that φ∗ = χ∆φ . Therefore, any positive homogeneous function φ
can be represented as φ(X) = sup
Y ∈∆φ
E(Y X). By using this and that φ = φ∗∗, one
can easily see that for any convex set C, χ∗C(Y ) = sup
X∈C
E(Y X). As a result, if C
is a convex cone and φ is a positive homogeneous convex function then φC(X) =
sup
Y ∈∆φ+C⊥
E(Y X), where C⊥ = {Y ∈ Lq;E(Y X) ≤ 0, ∀X ∈ C} (or ∆φC = ∆ + C
⊥).
A particular interesting example is C = Lp+ when C
⊥ = Lq−.
For a set of convex functions φ1, ..., φn their infimal convolution is defined as
φ1...φn(X) = inf
X1+...+Xn=X
φ1(X1) + ...+ φn(Xn). (5)
In Rockafellar (1997) Theorems 5.4 and 16.4 it is shown that (φ1...φn)
∗ = φ∗1 +
...+φ∗n. By using the arguments above one can easily see that if φ1, ..., φn are positive
homogeneous then φ1...φn(X) = sup
Y ∈∩i∆φi
E(Y X). As a result
Theorem 1. The infimum in the infimal convolution is bounded if and only if
∩i∆φi 6= ∅.
Another classical result is the following
Theorem 2. Assume that φ1, ..., φn are n positive homogenous convex function. The
following two statements are equivalent
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1. (X1, ..., Xn) is an optimal allocation for X i.e., X1+ ...+Xn = X and φ1(X1)+
...+ φn(Xn) = φ1...φn(X);
2. There exists Y ∈ Lq such that φi(Xi) = E(Y Xi), i = 1, ..., n.
For a proof one can see Jouini et al. (2008). Let M1, ...,Mn are n convex and closed
cones, subsets of Lp, representing n constraints that agents 1 to n face in the economy.
Then by replacing φi with φ
Mi in the above, we can consider the same setting which
also incorporates the economy constraint in the problem.
And finally the positive infimal convolution is denoted by ̺1⊡ ...⊡̺n as is defined
as
̺1 ⊡ ...⊡ ̺n(X) = inf
X1+...+Xn=X,Xi≥0,i=1,...,n
φ1(X1) + ...+ φn(Xn).
3 Problem Set-up
Let us assume there are n different agents in the market whose preferences are ac-
cording to n distortion risk measures ̺1, . . . , ̺n. We denote the associated kernels
with Φ1,...,Φn. The risk of the whole market is modeled by a loss variable X0. The
set of allocations denoted by A is defined as follows
A = {(X1, ..., Xn) ∈ (L
p)n |X1 + ... +Xn = X0} .
An optimal allocation is an allocation which minimizes the aggregate risk
inf
X1+...+Xn=X0
̺1(X1) + ...+ ̺n(Xn), (6)
An asymptotic optimal allocation is a sequence {(Xm1 , ..., X
m
n )}m=1,2,... ⊆ A, such
that
̺1(X
m
1 ) + ...+ ̺n(X
m
n ) m→∞−−−−−→ infX1+...+Xn=X0
̺1(X1) + ...+ ̺n(Xn). (7)
It is clear that the existence of an asymptotic optimal allocation is equivalent to
the boundedness of (6). For further development of the existing setting we have to
consider a wider problem
inf
(X1,...,Xn)∈A
λ1̺1(X1) + ... + λn̺n(Xn), (8)
when (λ1, ..., λn) is an arbitrary set of positive numbers. For instance, Pareto allo-
cations in a market whose agent utilities are −̺i, i = 1, ..., n, are the solutions to
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this problem. We will see that if there is no friction in the market, then for any
set of coherent risk measures ̺1, ..., ̺n, λi’s should be equal. On the other hand, in
(re-)insurance studies, one can find a risk sharing problem which has very similar
components; ̺1 is a risk measure, measuring the ceding company global risk, and ̺2
is a risk premium function, pricing the reinsurance contracts. In this problem λ1 = 1
and λ2 = 1 + ρ is a relative safely loading parameter (for more details see example
below).
3.1 General Solutions
Our approach in this section is to reduce the risk allocation problem to an inner
problem which can be solved by the existing results in the literature. Even though
the general form of a distortion risk is not a coherent risk measure, thanks to the
following statement we can use the convex analysis approaches to study (8).
Theorem 3. (Infimal Characterization of distortion Risks) Let
̺Φ(X) =
ˆ 1
0
VaRs(X)dΦ(s),
for a non-decreasing function Φ as in Definition 1. If ̺Φ is L
p continuous, and X is
bounded below, we have the following equality
̺Φ(X) = min{̺(X)|for all l.s.c. coherent risk measures ̺ such that ̺ ≥ ̺Φ}.
Proof. First, we prove the theorem for p = ∞. Consider a sequence of partitions
Σk = {α
k
0 = 0 < α
k
1 < . . . , α
k
k < α
k
k+1 = 1}, k = 1, 2, ... of [0, 1] such that Σk ⊆ Σk+1
and mesh(Σk) → 0. According to Theorem 6.8. in Delbaen (2000), for a given
X there are coherent risk measures ̺ki , i = 1, . . . , k such that ̺
k
i ≥ VaRαki and
̺ki (X) = VaRαki (X). Define the following mappings on L
∞:
Vk(Y ) =
k∑
i=0
(Φ(αki+1)− Φ(α
k
i ))VaRαki (Y ) and ̺k(Y ) =
k∑
i=0
(Φ(αki+1)− Φ(α
k
i ))̺
k
i (Y ).
Define the coherent risk measure ̺ as
̺(Y ) = lim sup
k
̺k(Y ), ∀Y ∈ L
∞.
It is clear that ̺ is σ(L∞, L1)-l.s.c. Since ̺k ≥ Vk and ̺k(X) = Vk(X), by using the
very definition of an integral it turns out that ̺ ≥ ̺Φ and ̺(X) = ̺Φ(X).
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Now, let us assume that X ∈ Lp. Let Σ be the set of all finite sigma algebras
on Ω. Recall that Σ is a directed set. For any G ∈Σ let ̺G be a σ(L
∞, L1)-l.s.c
coherent risk measure which dominates ̺Φ on L
∞ and ̺Φ(E(X|G)) = ̺G(E(X|G)).
Let ̺(Y ) = lim supG ̺G(E(Y |G)), ∀Y ∈ L
p. Notice that for any Z ∈ L1, if Yk →
Y weakly in Lp, E(ZE(Yk|G)) = E(E(Z|G)Yk) → E(E(Z|G)Y ) = E(ZE(Y |G)).
Hence, each function Y 7→ ̺G(E(Y |G)) is L
p lower semicontinuous. This implies
that ̺ is also Lp lower semicontinuous. On the other hand, for any Y ∈ Lp, the net
{YG = E(Y |G)}G converges in L
p and therefore, converges in distribution to Y . This
implies that the sequence of functions {t 7→ VaRt(E(Y |G))}G converges point-wise
to the function t 7→ VaRt(Y ). Given that X is bounded below, by using a version of
the Fatou lemma for nets, we have that
̺Φ(Y ) =
ˆ 1
0
VaRt(Y )dΦ(t) ≤ lim inf
G
ˆ 1
0
VaRt(YG)dΦ(t)
= lim inf
G
̺Φ(YG) ≤ lim inf
G
̺G(E(Y |G)) ≤ lim sup
G
̺G(E(Y |G)) = ̺(Y )
With a similar argument as above, one can show that if instead of Fatou lemma
we use the dominated convergence theorem, and also the assumption that ̺Φ is L
p
continuous, we have that ̺Φ(X) = ̺(X).
The following theorem is almost an immediate result from the previous theorem
and Theorem 2.
Theorem 4. Let ̺1, ..., ̺n be n L
p-continuous distortion risk measures, λ1, ..., λn ,be
n positive numbers and M1, ...,Mn be n closed convex cones. Let us denote by Λ
Mi
i
the set of all functionals ˜̺Mii = ˜̺i + χMi, where ˜̺i is a coherent risk measure greater
than or equal to ̺i, i = 1, ..., n. If X0 is bounded below, the following statements for
an allocation (X1, ..., Xn) ∈ A hold
1. If (X1, ..., Xn) is an optimal allocation for problem (6) for all(λ1 ˜̺
M1, ..., λn ˜̺
Mn
n ) ∈
ΛM1 × ...× ΛMn, then it is optimal for (λ1̺
M1 , ..., λn̺
Mn).
2. If (X1, ..., Xn) is not optimal for any (λ1 ˜̺
M1, ..., λn ˜̺
Mn
n ) ∈ Λ
M1× ...×ΛMn , then
it is not optimal for (λ1̺
M1, ..., λn̺
Mn).
3. If (X1, ..., Xn) is an optimal allocation for (λ1̺
M1 , ..., λn̺
Mn) then there exists
Y ∈ Lq such that λi̺
Mi(Xi) = E(XiY ), i = 1, ..., n.
Remark 2. From pricing point of view, in the third statement of the previous theorem,
Y can be interpreted as the “generalized stochastic discount factor”. For further
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reading on the relation between the set of stochastic discount factors and the optimal
risk allocations see Filipovic´ and Kupper (2008a).
In the following theorem we study the existence of an asymptotic optimal allo-
cation.
Theorem 5. Let ̺1, ..., ̺n be n distortion risk measures, and for each i=1,...,n,
let Λi denote the set of all coherent risk measures ˜̺i ≥ ̺i. If the total risk X0
is bounded below by M ∈ R, (8) is bounded if and only if ∩iλi∆ ˜̺i 6= ∅ for all
( ˜̺1, ..., ˜̺n) ∈ Λ1 × ....× Λn.
Proof. By Theorem 3
inf
X1+...+Xn=X0
λ1̺1(X1) + ...+ λn̺n(Xn)
= inf
X1+...+Xn=X0
{
min
˜̺1∈Λ1
λ1 ˜̺1(X1) + ... + min
˜̺n∈Λn
λn ˜̺n(Xn)
}
= inf
( ˜̺1,..., ˜̺n)∈Λ1×....×Λn
inf
X1+...+Xn=X
{
λ1 ˜̺1(X1) + ... + λn ˜̺n(Xn)
}
= inf
( ˜̺1,..., ˜̺n)∈Λ1×....×Λn
sup
Y ∈∩iλi∆ ˜̺i
E(Y X0). (9)
It is clear that if the infimum in (9) is bounded then all intersections ∩iλi∆ ˜̺i , for all
( ˜̺1, ..., ˜̺n) ∈ Λ1 × ....× Λn, are non-empty. On the other hand, since ∀Y ∈ ∆ ˜̺i , i =
1, ..., n, Y ≥ 0, E(Y ) = 1 and X0 ≥M , we have that E(Y X0) ≥ −|M |. This implies
that if all the intersections ∩iλi∆ ˜̺i , for all ( ˜̺1, ..., ˜̺n) ∈ Λ1× ....×Λn, are non-empty,
then the right hand side of (9) is bounded below by −|M |maxi λi, and therefore, (9)
is bounded.
Now we have the following corollaries
Corollary 1. The boundedness of the problem (8) is independent of the total risk.
Corollary 2. For X0 ≥ 0, (8) has a solution if and only if λ1 = ... = λn and
∩i∆ ˜̺i 6= ∅.
Example 1. Let ̺1 = VaRα and ̺2 = E, and let us assume X0 is any arbitrary
random loss. According to Theorem 5, the optimal risk allocation problem (8) has
a solution if P ∈ ∆ ˜̺ for any coherent risk measure ˜̺ ≥ VaRα. On the other hand,
according to Theorem 3 for any X ∈ Lp, VaRα(X) = ˜̺(X) for some coherent risk
measure ˜̺ ≥ VaRα. This implies that VaRα(X) ≥ E(X), for any X ∈ L
p. This
inequality clearly does not hold, if we choose X = 1A for some set A ∈ F that
0 < P (A) < 1−α
2
.
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Theorems 4 and 5 can be considered as generalization of many existing papers
in the literature where their result can only be applied to coherent risk measures,
which in our setting is to use singleton setsΛi = {̺i}; see for instance Jouini et al.
(2008) , Filipovic´ and Kupper (2008a) and Filipovic´ and Kupper (2008b)
3.2 Co-monotone allocations and Admissible Allocations
Concerning the discussion we had about moral hazard, in this section we assume that
all contracts in the market are designed to be co-monotone. To set this economic
assumption on a sound mathematical basis, we assume that all contracts are non-
decreasing functions of the total risk. Therefore, in a market with this assumption
any allocation (X1,..., Xn) is equal to (f1(X0), ..., fn(X0)) when f1, ..., fn are n non-
negative and non-decreasing functions such that f1 + ...+ fn = id.
We introduce the set of allocations as
C =
{
f ∈ L0+(R+)
∣∣∣f is nondecreasing and f(0) = 0} .
and the set of admissible allocation as
AC = {(f1, ..., fn) ∈ C
n|f1 + ....+ fn = id} .
AC is a closed, convex and weakly compact set of Lp(R) for p ∈ [1,∞). On the other
hand, it is easy to see that any component fi, is a Lipschitz function of degree one,
i.e. 0 ≤ fi(y) − fi(x) ≤ y − x, for 0 ≤ x ≤ y. Indeed, it is enough to check it for
n = 2. In this paper, we focus our attention to the allocation set induced by AC
AA = {(f1(X0), ..., fn(X0))|(f1, ...., fn) ∈ AC} .
Filipovic´ and Svindland (2008) prove that for a set of n law and cash invariant convex
functions ̺1, ..., ̺n, any solution (X1, ..., Xn) to (6) is co-monotone. In particular
this means that in a market with convex distortion risks the optimal allocations are
automatically from AC. This is no longer true for the general case as shown in the
following example.
Example 2. Let us assume ̺1 = VaRα, ̺2 = VaRβ, X0 > 0, a.s., α + β > 1 and
0 < α < β < 1. Let us assume X0 is a random variable with a strictly increasing and
continuous CDF function FX0 . Since n = 2 in this example, one can assume that
there is a function f such that f and id − f are non-negative, non-decreasing and
that f1 = f and f2 = id− f . We first prove the following lemma
11
Lemma 1. There is a positive number c > 0 such that for any function f described
above, the following inequality holds
VaRα(f(X0)) + VaRβ(X0 − f(X0)) > c+VaRα+β−1(X0).
Proof. It is known that Value at Risk can commute with a non-decreasing function,
therefore,
VaRα(f(X0)) = f(VaRα(X0)),
VaRβ(X0 − f(X0)) = VaRβ(X0)− f(VaRβ(X0)).
Strict monotonicity of FX0 , α < β and α+ β − 1 < α imply
VaRα(f(X0)) + VaRβ(X0 − f(X0)) = f(VaRα(X0)) + VaRβ(X0)− f(VaRβ(X0))
≥ VaRβ(X0) + (VaRα(X0)− VaRβ(X0))
= VaRα(X0) > c+VaRα+β−1(X0),
where c =
VaRα(X0)−VaRα+β−1(X0)
2
.
The result of the lemma is that there is no admissible allocation which can attain
the value VaRα+β−1(X0). Now let us consider the allocation X1 = X01{X0>VaRα(X0)}.
It is clear that P (X1 > 0) = 1−α, meaning that VaRα(X1) = 0. On the other hand,
P (X2 > x) = P (X0 > x&VaRα(X0) ≥ X0)
= P (X0 ≤ VaRα(X0))− P (X0 ≤ x)
= α− FX0(x).
This simply implies that FX2(x) = 1 + FX0(x) − α, and therefore VaRβ(X2) =
VaRα+β−1(X0). Hence, we have that VaRα(X1) + VaRβ(X2) = VaRα+β−1(X0).
Allocation (X1, X2) is an example of a moral hazard situation, where agent 2
is not sensitive to the big total losses. This example shows why in a market with
non-convex beliefs we have to further assume that there is no risk of moral hazard.
Remark 3. Observe that if all agents in the market use the same risk measure ̺, by
using the fact that VaR commutes with non-decreasing functions, we have
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̺(f1(X0)) + ... + ̺(fn(X0)) = ̺(X0), ∀(f1, ..., fn) ∈ AC.
This means, no matter what allocation the agents use, as far as there is no risk of
moral hazard, the value of the systemic risk remains constant. This may happen
if the regulator imposes a unique risk measure to all agents, for example the same
VaR0.995 as in the Solvency II, to measure the capital reserve.
3.3 Marginal Risk Allocations
It is known that every Lipschitz continuous function f is almost everywhere dif-
ferentiable and its derivative is essentially bounded by its Lipschitz constant. Fur-
thermore, f can be written as the integral of its derivative denoted by, i.e., f(x) =´ x
0
h(t)dt. Therefore, the set C can be represented as
C =
{
f ∈ L0(R+)
∣∣∣f(x) = ˆ x
0
h(t)dt, 0 ≤ h ≤ 1
}
.
Let us introduce the space of marginal risk allocations as
D =
{
h ∈ L0(R+)
∣∣∣0 ≤ h ≤ 1} .
Definition 3. For any function f ∈ C, the associated marginal risk allocation is a
function h ∈ D such that
f(x) =
ˆ x
0
h(t)dt, x ≥ 0.
The interpretation of marginal risk allocation is as follows: if f(x) =
´ x
0
h(t)dt
is in C, then at each value X0 = x, a marginal change δ to the value of the total
risk will result in marginal change of the size δh(x) in the allocation risk. We will
see in the following that this marginal change is either 0 or δ, i.e., h = 0 or 1. This
means that for any small change in the total risk, there is only one agent who has to
tolerate the changes in the risk.
3.4 Co-monotone Optimal Risk Allocations
Throughout this section we assume X0 ≥ 0 and FX0(0) =0. Furthermore, we restrict
our attention to a family of distortion risk measures which satisfy the following
regularity condition
lim
m→∞
̺i(X ∧m) = ̺i(X), i = 1, ..., n. (10)
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Let Ψ(t) = min {λ1(1− Φ1(t)), ..., λn(1− Φn(t))}. Suppose k
∗
i , i = 1, ..., n is a set of
functions that
k∗i (t) =
{
1, if λi (1− Φi(t)) < λj (1− Φj(t)) ∀i 6= j
0, if λi (1− Φi(t)) > λj (1− Φj(t)) ∃i 6= j
, (11)
where also k∗1 + ... + k
∗
n = 1. Here we state the main result of this section
Theorem 6. If ̺1, ..., ̺n satisfy (10), the co-monotone solutions to the optimization
problem (8) is given by Xi = f
∗
i (X0) when
f ∗i (x) =
ˆ x
0
k∗i (VaRt(X0))dt, i = 1, ..., n. (12)
Furthermore, the value at minimum is given byˆ ∞
0
Ψ(s)ds. (13)
Proof. Let ̺i =
´ 1
0
VaRt(X0)dΦi(t) , i = 1, ..., n. Then for any member (f1, ...., fn)
from the set AC, using the fact that VaR always commutes with non-decreasing
functions, we have
λ1̺1(f1(X0)) + ....+ λn̺n(fn(X0))
=
ˆ 1
0
λ1VaRt(f1(X0))dΦ1(t) + ...+
ˆ 1
0
λnVaRt(fn(X0))dΦn(t)
=
ˆ 1
0
λ1f1(VaRt(X0))dΦ1(t) + ...+
ˆ 1
0
λnfn(VaRt(X0))dΦn(t). (14)
Let us denote the derivatives of f1, ..., fn by h1, ...., hn. Therefore,
λ1̺1(f1(X0)) + ....+ λn̺n(fn(X0))
=
ˆ 1
0
(ˆ VaRt(X0)
0
λ1h1(s)ds
)
dΦ1(t) + ...+
ˆ 1
0
(ˆ VaRt(X0)
0
λnhn(s)ds
)
dΦn(t).
First, we assume X0 is bounded. By Fubini’s Theorem we have
λ1̺1(f1(X0)) + ....+ λn̺n(fn(X0))
=
ˆ ∞
0
[(ˆ 1
FX0(s)
λ1dΦ1(t)
)
h1(s) + ...+
(ˆ 1
FX0(s)
λndΦn(t)
)
hn(s)
]
ds
=
ˆ ∞
0
[λ1 (1− Φ1 (FX0(s))) h1(s) + ...+ λn (1− Φn (FX0(s)))hn(s)] ds
(15)
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where we use the fact that Φ1(1) = ... = Φn(1) = 1. It is now clear that the following
(h∗1, ..., h
∗
n) will minimize (15)
h∗i (s) =
{
1, if λi(1− Φi(FX0(s))) < λj(1− Φj(FX0(s))), ∀i 6= j
0 if λi(1− Φi(FX0(s))) > λj(1− Φj(FX0(s))), ∃i 6= j
(16)
where also h∗1 + ... + h
∗
n = 1. The value of the minimum also is equal toˆ ∞
0
Ψ(s)ds. (17)
If we make a simple change of variable t = FX0(s), we get the result.
Now assume the general case when X0 is not bounded. It is clear that at each
point t, for every i between 1 and n, {Φi ◦ FX0∧m(t)}
∞
m=1 is non-increasing with
respect to m. On the other hand, for any t, there exist mt such that if m > mt
then FX0∧m(t) = FX0(t). Therefore, at each point t, we have that Φi(FX0∧m(t)) ↓
Φi(FX0(t)). By monotone convergence theorem we have that
lim
m→∞
∞ˆ
0
Φi(FX0∧m(t))h(t)dt =
∞ˆ
0
Φi(FX0(t))h(t)dt,
for any function h ∈ D. Using this fact and our continuity assumption
̺i(f(X0)) = lim
m→∞
̺i(f(X0) ∧ f(m))
= lim
m→∞
̺i(f(X0 ∧m))
= lim
m→∞
ˆ ∞
0
(1− Φi(FX0∧m(s)))h(s)ds
=
ˆ ∞
0
(1− Φi(FX0(s)))h(s)ds
This simply results in
λ1̺1(f1(X0)) + ....+ λn̺n(fn(X0))
=
ˆ ∞
0
[λ1(1− Φ1(FX0(s)))h1(s) + ...+ λn(1− Φn(FX0(s))))hn(s)]ds
The rest of the proof follows the same lines after (15).
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Remark 4. As one can see form the last theorem, k∗i , i = 1, ..., n only depend on
market preferences, and therefore, they are universal. Also one can see from (12)
how the role of the total risk and the market preferences are separated.
Remark 5. In Theorem 6, it is shown that the marginal risk allocations take only
the values zero or one. There are some similar results in the literature of actu-
arial mathematics which can prove this for very particular settings, for instance;
see Cai et al. (2008), Cheung (2010),Chi (2012b), Chi (2012a), Chi and Tan (2013)
, Cheung et al. (2014) and more recently Assa (2015). Theorem 6 can extend all
those works form two different aspects. First, we use a larger family of risk measures
and premiums (distortion risk measures and premiums) which include almost all risk
measures such as VaR and CVaR and risk premiums such as Wang’s premium, used
by them. Second, our work can increase the number of players from two (insurance
and re-insurance company) to n, which otherwise, by using the techniques from the
existing literature would be either impossible or at least very difficult to do.
Corollary 3. If λ1 = .... = λn then ̺1 ⊡ ...⊡ ̺n = ̺Φ when Φ = max {Φ1, ....,Φn}.
Example 3. Let us consider the example we discussed earlier. Let us consider
that there are two companies using ̺1 = VaRα and ̺2 = VaRβ, where α < β. It is
clear that since α < β one solution is h1 = 1 and h2 = 0 and ̺1̺2(X0) = VaRα(X0).
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